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Ramirez v. State, 126 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 22 (July 1, 2010) 1
CRIMINAL LAW –JURY INSTRUCTIONS REGARDING SECOND-DEGREE
FELONY MURDER
Summary
This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction in the Second Judicial District Court,
pursuant to a jury verdict of second-degree felony murder by means of child abuse, neglect, or
endangerment.
Disposition/Outcome
The Nevada Supreme Court reversed the district court’s judgment of conviction because
jurors were not properly instructed on the necessary elements of second-degree felony murder.
Factual and Procedural History
Felicia Ramirez (“Ramirez”) and her boyfriend, Joel Aponte (“Aponte”), were each
charged with alternative courts of first-degree felony murder by child abuse and second-degree
murder by means of child neglect or endangerment based on the death of their sixteen day-old
daughter, Trinity. Trinity’s death was the result of about twelve blows to the head with a blunt
object. Aponte reached a plea agreement byagreeing to plead guilty to child neglect or
endangerment and testifying against Ramirez.
During trial, Aponte and Ramirez both testified and offered conflicting stories of the
night of Trinity’s death. Aponte testified that Trinity was already in her crib when he returned
home. Ramirez testified that Trinity was asleep on the couch when Aponte returned home that
evening and it was only later that Aponte took Trinity to bed. Aponte also testified that Ramirez
was violent, suicidal, and did not want any more children. Ramirez testified that Aponte was
physically and emotionally abusive to her and that he had been very uninterested in raising their
children. Two other witnesses testified that Aponte was very emotional following Trinity’s
death, but that Ramirez was not.
The jury acquitted Ramirez of first-degree felony murder by means of child abuse but
found her guilty second-degree felony murder by means of child neglect or endangerment. The
district court subsequently sentenced Ramirez to a term of life imprisonment with the possibility
of parole after ten years. This appeal followed.
Discussion
The Offense of Second-degree Murder
The Court first recognized the offense of second-degree felony murder in Sheriff v.
Morris. 2 There, the Court concluded that Nevada’s involuntary manslaughter statute, NRS
200.070, when read in conjuncture with the murder statute, NRS 200.030(2), permitted second-
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Sheriff v. Morris, 99 Nev. 109, 659 P.2d. 852 (1983).

degree felony murder. 3 The Court was mindful “of the potential for untoward prosecution” and
limited the rule to cases where there is “an immediate and direct causal relationship between the
actions of the defendant . . . and the [victim’s] demise.” 4 The Court defined immediate to mean
“without the intervention of some other source or agency.” 5 The Court further limited the rule
by requiring that the felony be inherently dangerous when viewed in the abstract, so that a
potential felon can foresee the possibility of death or injury. 6
The Court reaffirmed its narrow and limited precedent and succinctly stated that the
second-degree felony murder rule only applies: (1) where the predicate felony is inherently
dangerous and (2) “where there is an immediate and direct causal relationship . . . between the
actions of the defendant and the victim’s death.” 7 Because of the potential for untoward
prosecutions, these two elements are critical to any second-degree felony murder jury instruction.
The Jury was not Properly Instructed on the Immediate-and-direct-casual-relationship
Element
The district court instructed the jury that the State must prove that: (1) Ramirez did
“willfully and unlawfully” (2) “permit or allow” Trinity (3) “to suffer unjustifiable physical pain
as a result of neglect or endangerment,” and (4) Trinity “died as a foreseeable consequence of the
neglect or endangerment.” Because of the fourth item, the jury was properly instructed on the
inherently dangerous prong required of second-degree felony murder. 8 However, the jury was
not instructed that there must have been an immediate and direct causal connection between
Ramirez’s unlawful act and Trinity’s death. Therefore, Ramirez was not provided a complete
and accurate instruction on second-degree felony murder.
The Incomplete Instruction Affected Ramirez’s Substantial Rights
Reversal is only required if the error is plain from a review of the record and affects a
defendant’s substantial rights. 9 “An error that is plain from a review of the record does not
require reversal unless the defendant demonstrates that the error affected his or her substantial
rights by causing actual prejudice or a miscarriage of justice.” 10 While the failure to provide the
specific elements of second-degree felony murder, standing alone, might not amount to plain
error, Ramirez’s substantial rights were affected by the improper instruction because (1) the State
failed to specify the felony and, thus Ramirez could have been convicted under a potentially
invalid predicate offense; and (2) there was conflicting evidence as to whether Ramirez or
Aponte inflicted Trinity’s mortal wounds.
The State Failed to Specify the Predicate Felony to Support a Second-degree Felony
Murder Conviction
3

Id. at 113, 117-18, 659 P.2d at 856, 858-59.
Id. at 118, 659 P.2d at 859.
5
Id. at 118-19, 659 P.2d at 859.
6
Id. at 118, 659 P.2d at 859.
7
Labastida v. State, 115 Nev. 298, 307, 986 P.2d 443, 448-49 (1999) (citing Morris, 99 Nev. at 118, 659 P.2d at
859).
8
See e.g., id.
9
See Valdez v. State, 124 Nev. 1172, 1190, 196 P.3d 465, 477 (2008); NEV. REV. STAT. § 178.602 (2007); see also
NEV. REV. STAT. § 177.255 (2007).
10
Valdez, 124 Nev. at 1190, 196 P.3d at 477 (internal quotations omitted).
4

Nevada’s felony offense of child neglect and endangerment provides that a person can be
held criminally liable for both willful and passive neglect. 11 Because the law applies to a person
who does not directly inflict the harm to be guilty of child abuse, in many instances Nev. Rev.
Stat. § 200.508(2) cannot serve as a predicate felony. 12 Here the State charged Ramirez with
second-degree felony murder under Nev. Rev. Stat § 508 without specifying between subsection
1 and 2. Accordingly, the jury was not appropriately instructed as to the predicate felony.
There was Conflicting Evidence as to Whether Ramirez or Aponte Inflicted Trinity’s
Mortal Wounds
Given the conflicting evidence on who inflicted Trinity’s mortal wounds, the causal
element of second-degree felony murder was critically important. Although there was evidence
that Ramirez could have caused Trinity’s death, there was also evidence to the contrary.
Because of the conflicting evidence, the Court could not be certain that the jury determined that
Ramirez was the immediate and direct cause of Trinity’s death.
Conclusion
As a result of these two errors, the Court concluded that the improper jury instruction
was prejudicial and affected Ramirez’s substantial rights. Accordingly the district court’s
judgment of conviction was reversed and the matter was remanded for a new trial.

11

NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.508 (2007).
Cf. Labastida, 115 Nev. at 307, 986 P.2d at 449 (concluding that Labastida’s commission of child neglect could
not support her second-degree murder conviction because her husband was the person who committed the harm).
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No. 46417

FELICIA GARCIA RAMIREZ,
Appellant,
vs.
THE STATE OF NEVADA,
Respondent.

Appeal from a judgment of conviction, upon a jury verdict, of second-degree felony
murder by means of child abuse, neglect, or endangerment. Second Judicial District Court,
Washoe County; Janet J. Berry, Judge.
Reversed and remanded.
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BEFORE THE COURT EN BANC.

OPINION

By the Court, PARRAGUIRRE, C.J.:
In this appeal, we consider whether the jury was properly instructed on the offense of
second-degree felony murder by means of child neglect or endangerment. For the reasons
outlined in this opinion, we conclude that the jury was not completely and accurately instructed
as to the necessary elements of second-degree felony murder and that the improper instruction
affected appellant Felicia Ramirez’s substantial rights. Accordingly, we reverse the district
court’s judgment of conviction and remand this matter for a new trial.[1]
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Appellant Felicia Ramirez and her boyfriend, Joel Aponte, were each charged with
alternative counts of first-degree felony murder by means of child abuse and second-degree
felony murder by means of child neglect or endangerment based on the death of their 16-day-old
daughter, Trinity. Ramirez and Aponte had two children together, another daughter and newborn
Trinity.
At trial, expert testimony established that Trinity’s death was the result of about 12 blows
to the head with a blunt object no more than 12 hours before she was declared dead. She also
had two small fractures to the back left ribs. Evidence at trial established that the child had been
exclusively in the care of Aponte and Ramirez during that 12-hour time frame, and a pediatrician
testified that Trinity was in good health a few days before her death. Aponte and Ramirez were
arrested and charged approximately nine months after Trinity’s death.
Shortly before their trial, Aponte reached a plea agreement with the State. He agreed to
plead guilty to child neglect or endangerment resulting in substantial bodily injury or death in
exchange for testifying against Ramirez. At trial, Aponte testified that when he returned home
around 5 or 5:30 p.m. on the evening that Trinity died, Trinity was pale and lethargic, but he saw
no other signs of distress. Ramirez asked him to check on Trinity several times that night when
she thought she heard Trinity crying. When he checked on Trinity around 9 or 9:30 p.m., she
was not breathing.
He also testified to two incidents indicating that Ramirez was violent, suicidal, and did
not want any more children. According to Aponte, when Ramirez was pregnant with Trinity, she
arrived at his house drunk, began yelling that she did not want to live anymore or deal with
another child, threatened to kill herself and their children, hit herself in the stomach, threw
herself against a set of concrete stairs, and lay in the street saying she would let the cars run over
her. He further testified that on another occasion after Trinity’s birth, Ramirez responded to
Aponte’s decision to leave her by yelling, throwing things, and saying that she did not want to be
a mother or to live anymore.

Ramirez testified that she was home alone with Trinity from 10 a.m. to 5 p.m. on the day
Trinity died and that Trinity had been fussy, irritated, and a little sick with a cold. When Aponte
arrived home at 5 p.m., Trinity was asleep on the couch. According to Ramirez, she and Aponte
watched a basketball game while Trinity slept on the couch and then, while Ramirez made
popcorn, Aponte put Trinity to bed. Aponte then checked on Trinity a few times after that.
Ramirez testified that she did not hurt Trinity and did not see Aponte hurt Trinity.
Ramirez also explained that she attempted suicide about eight months after Trinity’s
death because Aponte left her, Trinity was dead, and their other daughter had been taken by child
services. Ramirez told the jury that she did not know she was pregnant with a third child at the
time of the suicide attempt. She also explained that she was referring to Aponte leaving her,
Trinity’s death, and her other child being taken away by child services when she said that she
was “sorry for what [she] did,” that she had “failed as a mother and a girlfriend,” and that “[i]t’s
all my fault” in her suicide note.
Ramirez testified about her relationship with Aponte and his interaction with their
children. In particular, she testified that Aponte was physically and emotionally abusive to her
and that he had not been very interested in raising their two children. While Aponte would help
with the children sometimes when asked, he was resistant and would get frustrated quickly,
calling Trinity names when she cried. Ramirez testified that Aponte would say, “that bitch cries
too much” and instruct Ramirez to “shut the bitch up.”
Two witnesses testified about Aponte’s and Ramirez’s demeanor on the night of Trinity’s
death. The first paramedic responding to Ramirez’s 9-1-1 call testified that Aponte was
hysterical but that Ramirez did not cry. Similarly, the coroner’s investigator who picked up
Trinity’s body at the hospital testified that Aponte was crying but Ramirez was not.
The jury acquitted Ramirez of first-degree felony murder by means of child abuse but
found her guilty of second-degree felony murder by means of child neglect or endangerment.
The district court subsequently sentenced Ramirez to a term of life imprisonment with the
possibility of parole after ten years. This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
The jury was not completely and accurately instructed on the offense of second-degree felony
murder by means of child neglect or endangerment
Although she failed to object at trial, Ramirez now contends that the jury was not
completely and accurately instructed on the necessary elements of second-degree felony murder
by means of child neglect or endangerment. We agree that the jury was not properly instructed
as to all the necessary elements of second-degree felony murder. And because we conclude that
the error affected Ramirez’s substantial rights, we reverse the judgment of conviction and
remand for a new trial despite Ramirez’s failure to object to the instruction below.
The offense of second-degree felony murder

We first recognized the substantive offense of second-degree felony murder in Sheriff v.
Morris, 99 Nev. 109, 659 P.2d 852 (1983). In Morris, we concluded that Nevada’s involuntary
manslaughter statute, NRS 200.070, when read in conjunction with Nevada’s murder statute,
NRS 200.030(2), permitted the offense of second-degree murder under the felony-murder rule.
See id. at 113, 117-18, 659 P.2d at 856, 858-59.
This court, however, was mindful “of the potential for untoward prosecution resulting
from th[at] decision.” Id. at 118, 659 P.2d at 859. As a result, we specifically limited
application of the second-degree felony-murder rule to the “narrow confines of this case wherein
we perceive an immediate and direct causal relationship between the actions of the defendant, if
proved, and the [victim’s] demise.” Id. We defined the term “immediate” to mean “without the
intervention of some other source or agency.” Id. at 118-19, 659 P.2d at 859. We further limited
the application of the rule to felonies that are inherently dangerous when viewed in the abstract.
Id. at 118, 659 P.2d at 859. We recognized that “[t]here can be no deterrent value in a second
degree felony murder rule unless the felony is inherently dangerous since it is necessary that a
potential felon foresees the possibility of death or injury resulting from the commission of the
felony.” Id.
Later, in Labastida v. State, we reaffirmed our narrow and limited holding in Morris, and
succinctly stated that the second-degree felony-murder rule only applies when the following two
elements are satisfied: (1) “where the [predicate] felony is inherently dangerous, where death or
injury is a directly foreseeable consequence of the illegal act,” and (2) “where there is an
immediate and direct causal relationship—without the intervention of some other source or
agency—between the actions of the defendant and the victim’s death.” 115 Nev. 298, 307, 986
P.2d 443, 448-49 (1999) (citing Morris, 99 Nev. at 118, 659 P.2d at 859). Because we have
repeatedly expressed disapproval at the potential for untoward prosecutions resulting from our
decision to recognize the second-degree felony-murder rule and consciously limited application
of the rule, these two elements are critical to any second-degree felony-murder jury instruction.
The jury was not properly instructed on the immediate-and-direct-causal-relationship element
The district court instructed the jury that the State must prove the following four elements
to support a conviction for second-degree felony murder: (1) Ramirez “did willfully and
unlawfully” (2) “permit or allow” Trinity (3) “to suffer unjustifiable physical pain as a result of
neglect or endangerment,” and (4) Trinity “died as a foreseeable consequence of the neglect or
endangerment.”
By instructing the jury that the State must prove that Trinity “died as a foreseeable
consequence of the neglect or endangerment,” the jury was properly instructed on the inherently
dangerous element.[2] See, e.g., Labastida, 115 Nev. at 307, 986 P.2d at 448-49. However, in
reviewing the instruction, it is clear that the jury was not instructed that there must be an
immediate and direct causal connection between Ramirez’s unlawful act or acts and Trinity’s
death. Therefore, we conclude that Ramirez was not provided a complete and accurate
instruction on the offense of second-degree felony murder.
The incomplete instruction affected Ramirez’s substantial rights

Even though the jury was not instructed on the necessary elements for the crime of
second-degree felony murder, because Ramirez did not object to the incomplete and inaccurate
instruction at trial, reversal is only required if the error is plain from a review of the record and
affected Ramirez’s substantial rights. See Valdez v. State, 124 Nev. 1172, 1190, 196 P.3d 465,
477 (2008); NRS 178.602; see also NRS 177.255. “Under th[is] standard, an error that is plain
from a review of the record does not require reversal unless the defendant demonstrates that the
error affected his or her substantial rights, by causing actual prejudice or a miscarriage of
justice.” Valdez, 124 Nev. at 1190, 196 P.3d at 477 (internal quotations omitted).
While the failure to provide the specific elements of second-degree felony murder under
Morris and Labastida, standing alone, might not amount to plain error, we conclude that
Ramirez’s substantial rights were affected by the improper instruction because (1) the State
failed to specify the felony under which it sought a second-degree felony-murder conviction and,
thus, Ramirez could have been convicted of second-degree felony murder under a potentially
invalid predicate offense; and (2) there was conflicting evidence as to whether Ramirez or
Aponte inflicted Trinity’s mortal wounds.
The State failed to specify the predicate felony to support a second-degree felony-murder
conviction
Nevada’s felony offense of child neglect and endangerment, NRS 200.508, provides that
a person can be held criminally liable for both willful and passive neglect or endangerment.
Under NRS 200.508, a person is guilty of neglect or endangerment if he or she either (1)
“willfully causes a child . . . to suffer unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering as a result
of . . . neglect[[3]] or to be placed in a situation where the child may suffer physical pain or mental
suffering as the result of . . . neglect,” or (2) “is responsible for the safety or welfare of a child
and . . . permits[[4]] or allows[[5]] that child to suffer unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering
as a result of . . . neglect or to be placed in a situation where the child may suffer physical pain or
mental suffering as a result of the . . . neglect.” NRS 200.508(1) and (2) (emphases added).
Whereas NRS 200.508(1) addresses scenarios where the person charged under the statute
directly committed the harm, NRS 200.508(2), by contrast, addresses situations where a person
who is responsible for the safety and welfare of a child fails to take action to protect that child
from the abuse or neglect of another person or source. NRS 200.508(2) does not require that the
person directly inflict the harm to be found guilty of child abuse or neglect. As a result, in many
instances, NRS 200.508(2) cannot serve as a predicate felony to second-degree felony murder.
Cf. Labastida, 115 Nev. at 307, 986 P.2d at 449 (concluding that Labastida’s commission of
child neglect under NRS 200.508(2) could not support her second-degree murder conviction
because her husband was the person who committed the harm).
Here, the State charged Ramirez with second-degree felony murder under NRS 200.508
generally, without distinguishing between subsections 1 and 2. Further confusing the matter, the
State charged that Ramirez did “willfully and unlawfully . . . permit or allow [Trinity] to suffer
unjustifiable physical pain as a result of abuse or neglect,” including the “willful” language from
NRS 200.508(1), and the passive “permit” or “allow” language from NRS 200.508(2).

Because the State’s charging document and the instruction submitted to the jury
contained language from both NRS 200.508(1) and NRS 200.508(2), the jury was not
specifically instructed as to the predicate felony under which the State’s theory rested. This is
particularly important considering that Ramirez could not be found guilty of second-degree
felony murder under NRS 200.508(2) in the event that the jury believed that Aponte actually
killed Trinity. See Labastida, 115 Nev. at 307, 986 P.2d at 448-49 (noting that there must be “an
immediate and direct causal relationship—without the intervention of some other source or
agency—between the actions of the defendant and the victim’s death”).
There was conflicting evidence as to whether Ramirez or Aponte inflicted Trinity’s mortal
wounds
Given the conflicting evidence in this case, which indicated that either Ramirez or
Aponte could have inflicted Trinity’s mortal wounds, the causal element of second-degree felony
murder was critically important. Although there was evidence that Ramirez could have caused
Trinity’s death (Aponte testified that Ramirez had threatened to kill herself and her children;
doctors testified that Ramirez did not show any emotion the night Trinity died; Trinity was in
Ramirez’s exclusive custody and control for the majority of the time frame during which the
mortal injuries were inflicted; Ramirez did not see Aponte hit Trinity; and Ramirez attempted
suicide several months after Trinity’s death, leaving a suicide note apologizing “for what [she]
did”), there was also evidence to the contrary (Aponte cared for Trinity immediately before her
death; Ramirez testified that Trinity made an unusual cry when Aponte was attending to her; and
Aponte would get frustrated with the baby and call the baby names). Because of this conflicting
evidence, we cannot be certain that the jury determined that Ramirez was the immediate and
direct cause of Trinity’s death.[6]
As a result of these two considerations, we conclude that the improper jury instruction
was prejudicial and affected Ramirez’s substantial rights. Accordingly, we reverse the district
court’s judgment of conviction and remand this matter for a new trial.[7]

HARDESTY, DOUGLAS, CHERRY, SAITTA, GIBBONS, and PICKERING, JJ., concur.

**********FOOTNOTES**********
[1]
In addition to the specific challenges addressed in this opinion, Ramirez contends that
her conviction should be reversed on the grounds that (1) her Confrontation Clause rights were
violated; (2) the district court erred by admitting prior bad act evidence; (3) the State failed to
disclose evidence that was to be used at trial; (4) certain taped telephone conversations should
not have been admitted based on hearsay grounds; and (5) the jury should have been provided
instructions regarding malice, accomplice testimony, and the lesser included offense of felony
child neglect or endangerment causing substantial bodily harm. Separately, Ramirez argues that

because she never explicitly waived her right to jury sentencing, her sentence should be vacated
and remanded.
We do not address Ramirez’s remaining challenges because of our decision to reverse her
conviction on the basis set forth in this opinion.
[2]
The question of whether a felony is inherently dangerous, where death or injury is a
directly foreseeable consequence of the illegal act, is a question for the jury to determine under
the facts and circumstances of each case. Although our caselaw suggests that we look to whether
a felony is inherently dangerous in the abstract, see, e.g., Morris, 99 Nev. at 118, 659 P.2d at
859; Noonan v. State, 115 Nev. 184, 189, 980 P.2d 637, 640 (1999); Labastida, 115 Nev. at 307,
986 P.2d at 448, in practice this question has consistently been analyzed by looking to the
manner in which the felony was committed. See Morris, 99 Nev. at 118, 659 P.2d at 859 (stating
that under the facts of the case, the unauthorized sale of a controlled substance was inherently
dangerous); Noonan, 115 Nev. at 189, 980 P.2d at 640 (concluding that “leaving a sixteenmonth-old child alone in a bathtub for twenty-five to thirty minutes [was] inherently
dangerous”). Therefore, in reconciling these conflicting approaches, we abandon any suggestion
that we should look at the felony in the abstract to determine whether it is inherently dangerous
in favor of our practice of looking to the manner in which the felony was committed, which
happens to be the preferred approach. See, e.g., 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law
§14.5(b), at 447-48 (2d ed. 2003); State v. Stewart, 663 A.2d 912, 919 (R.I. 1995) (“[T]he better
approach [rather than viewing the elements of the felony in the abstract] is for the trier of fact to
consider the facts and circumstances of the particular case to determine if such felony was
inherently dangerous in the manner and the circumstances in which it was committed.”).
[3]
“[N]eglect” is defined as “physical or mental injury of a nonaccidental nature, sexual
abuse, sexual exploitation, negligent treatment or maltreatment of a child . . . under
circumstances which indicate that the child’s health or welfare is harmed or threatened with
harm.” NRS 200.508(4)(a).
[4]
“Permit means permission that a reasonable person would not grant and which amounts
to a neglect of responsibility attending the care, custody and control of a minor child.” NRS
200.508(4)(c) (internal quotations omitted).
[5]
“Allow means to do nothing to prevent or stop the . . . neglect of a child in circumstances
where the person knows or has reason to know that the child is . . . neglected.” NRS
200.508(4)(b) (internal quotations omitted).
[6]
The importance of the immediate-and-direct-causal-relationship element is further
supported by the fact that the jury acquitted Ramirez of first-degree felony murder by means of
child abuse.
[7]
While we agree that Ramirez’s conviction should be reversed and remanded for the
reasons expressed above, we do not agree with Ramirez’s contention that her conviction should
be reversed for insufficient evidence.

